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ABSTRACT
Justice is a contested concept. A more graspable understanding of it requires
the context of ‘injustice’. As such, a main theme of this paper is the
disjunction between, on the one hand, strong reactions to injustice and a
desire for some effective dimension to the EU, some normative adhesive that
might bind the EU as an ethical entity; and on the other, the very great
difficulty in identifying an enforceable concept of justice in an EU that
continues to be driven by a market mentality. This paper also argues that it is
the very sui generis, supranational status of the EU that creates particular
obstacles to the realisation of a shared sense of justice. Due to this structural
limitation, it is argued that any agreed concept of justice will remain
minimalist. However, human rights remain a powerful symbolic and actual
force for justice and a better focus for its achievement.
KEYWORDS Justice; injustice; human rights; EU law; transnational law
I. Why justice is particularly perplexing for the EU
Justice seems essential as a normative basis for the EU. What might be said of
a society or legal entity that would not embrace justice as a founding value?
However, for a long time, the notion of justice was overlooked as a conceptual
tool for analysing EU problems. Yet the events of the first decade of the
twenty-first century—the threat from terrorism, the financial crisis and the
problems of migration—have forced justice onto the agenda for the EU in a
way that might have seemed inconceivable in the 1990s,1 when some com-
mentators were forecasting, somewhat smugly, in the wake of the fall of the
communist bloc, an ‘end of history’,2 as if the West had emerged into a
Kantian age of perpetual peace.
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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1 See Grainne de Burca, Dmitry Kochenov and Andrew Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit (Hart Publish-
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TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/20414005.2017.1321907
But perhaps justice was best left out of the limelight. For any attempt to
bring it into focus reveals its essential perplexities in the EU context, which
may be summarised in the following five failures of justice in the EU: (1)
justice is not specifically stated as an EU value; (2) justice is inadequately con-
ceived in the context of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ); (3)
social justice is almost impossible to fulfil in EU law; (4) the Eurozone crisis
illustrates a lack of solidarity and disregard for justice and (5) it is impossible
to find an overarching concept of justice for the EU, given its complex and
indefinable nature (except in the very limited sense of ‘critical legal justice’).
What should we conclude? Except for the crucial task of ensuring respect
for critical legal justice (which is essentially based on ensuring observation
of the rule of law) and human rights, it is probably wise for the EU to
remain unambitious regarding justice as a value and goal, because the EU
will always fail to live up to expectations. This does not mean we should
not rigorously point out injustice where it occurs, and focus on injustice as
a motivation or call to action. However, human rights (whether or not we
understand them as a manifestation of justice) provide the most comprehen-
sible and compelling moral basis for the EU. The rest of this paper will set out
these arguments in greater detail.
Omission of justice as a specific value for the EU
Justice is notably not presented as one of the EU’s founding values in Article 2
of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). We are told that justice ‘should
prevail’ in this society but not that justice is one of its values. Why not?
One might believe it is possible to infer justice as a value for the EU from
the sum total of all the other values, aims, objectives and principles that it
embraces. Yet this seems unsatisfactory—one should not have to extract or
distil justice as a value from a range of clauses and provisions—its salience
surely renders its importance freestanding. For, as John Rawls stipulated,
‘[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions’—a suggestion to take
seriously, even if one does not concur with Rawls’ own substantive theory
of justice. So this is the first problem, or obstacle, for justice in the EU—the
omission of justice as a stated value.3
An inadequate concept of justice in the context of the AFSJ
Where we do find explicit references, the picture does not improve greatly. It
might be thought that an entity proclaiming the term ‘Justice’ in its title would
be a good place to examine the salience of justice for the EU. The EU created
the AFSJ in 1997 in the Treaty of Amsterdam. This was supposed to make the
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 3.
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EU citizen feel more included by the EU, as well as solving some particular
functional issues. Within the scope of the AFSJ, the EU adopts many measures
not traditionally associated with EU action, including measures on terrorism,
migration, visas and asylum, privacy and security, the fight against organised
crime and criminal justice.
Unfortunately, it has become almost a commonplace to state that, within
the AFSJ, freedom and justice have been sacrificed to security. This means,
among other things, that important human rights are sacrificed. Although
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) is now binding, the
EU has been slow to adopt measures on rights, and too quick to adopt
more coercive measures such as the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) or a
very broad definition of terrorism.4
It is hugely significant that within the scope of the AFSJ are matters which
have been core state powers—the provision of security, the provision of justice
and the relation between the individual and public authorities—indeed almost
at the heart of constitutional law. If the AFSJ is to be further developed, it should
preferably be as a space of hope, rather than what Pocock has called a ‘Machia-
vellian moment’ (ie an attempt to remain stable by any means in the face of a
stream of irrational events).5 However, also highly significant is the fact that the
interpretation given to justice in the AFSJ is very narrow, namely it is focused
on the ‘administration of justice’.6 Such an interpretation is no doubt supported
by the wording in some language versions of the EU treaties—the Dutch and
German versions use the word Recht, which does not have the same associ-
ations as ‘justice’ in English or in French, but connotes a narrower concern
for law and order. The EU’s 1998 Vienna Action Plan asserted the need to
‘bring[] to justice those who threaten the freedom and security of individuals
and society’ and therefore a need for crime control, for justice to be adminis-
tered, and for judicial cooperation.7 Justice is perceived as a means of dealing
with those who threaten society. This understanding leaves little room for
any richer sense of justice, and therefore justice, in the context of the AFSJ, is
elided and impoverished in meaning.8
Part of the problem is a failure of supranationalism. Are freedom, security
and justice actually goods that the EU can deliver? What is it about them that
4 See, eg, European Arrest Warrant (EAW), (Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA 1 (EU) on the EAW and the
surrender procedures between Member States OJ [2002] L 190/1; Council Framework Decision 2002/
475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.
5 JGA Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition
(Princeton University Press, 2nd edn 2003).
6 See Ester Herlin-Karnell, ‘The Domination of Security and the Promise of Justice: On Justification and Pro-
portionality in Europe’s “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”’ (2017) Transnational Legal Theory doi:10.
1080/20414005.2017.1316637 in this issue.
7 Council and Commission Action Plan (EC) on how best to implement the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area
of freedom, security and justice [1999] OJ C19/1.
8 See further on these points, Ester Herlin-Karnell, ‘Two Conceptions of Justice in EU Constitutionalism—
The Shaping of Security in Europe’ Inaugural lecture, VU University Amsterdam.
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requires their realisation at EU level? And is there sufficient consensus at EU
level about what they might mean? There has been very little reflection on
this. It is with the concept of security that there exists some agreement that
the EU can add value, at least if Eurobarometer polls are reliable. Unfortu-
nately, the overwhelming focus has been on security as a means of crime
control, which is a limited notion, rather than as a social and political
good, which is a deeper understanding that might also require the nurturing
of freedom and realisation of justice.9 Effective supranationalism also requires
states to have trust in each other’s’ criminal justice provisions, so that the
mutual recognition that underpins much of the AFSJ can function adequately.
Yet it is a formidable task to create such trust, because EU states do not deliver
uniform standards of justice. All member states are not equal, and cracks
appear in the system. A dominant emphasis on security (ie automatic surren-
der for the EAW) is at the expense of justice (protection of rights). Integration
is unbalanced, and although an internal market in security may be in the
process of being created, it is at the expense of progress in human rights,
freedom and/or justice. Justice in the AFSJ is curtailed by the problems of
supranationalism.
The lack of a shared conception of social justice
Article 3 of the TEU states that the EU ‘shall promote social justice’.10 Yet
is it possible to secure ‘social justice’ in an EU which has for so long
focused on market ideology? Admittedly, EU Law has been beneficial for
achieving equal treatment for men and women. However, for the most
part these benefits have been market driven, animated by the need to
secure a level playing field in an area of free movement, rather than
being a result of a freestanding concern for equality. And for much of
the EU’s existence, equal treatment law failed to extend beyond the
employment field and beyond the equal treatment of men and women to
discrimination of other sorts, such as discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation or race.
However, it would be unfair to accuse the EU of actively opposing social
justice. The situation is rather that a shared, redistributive social policy is
unrealisable in the EU when its member states are divided on whether
social welfare should be market driven or redistributionist and welfarist
(although the Eurozone crisis now seems to have imposed austerity through-
out the EU). Indeed, if anything, there exists a mutual mistrust, which was
9 See Lucia Zedner ‘The Concept of Security: An Agenda for Comparative Analysis’ (2003) Legal Studies 23;
Andrew Williams, The Ethos of Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
10 Article 3(2) TEU reads: ‘It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social
justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protec-
tion of the rights of the child’.
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illustrated by the polarised reactions to the Lisbon Treaty (with some states
seeing earlier drafts as too free market and Anglo-Saxon in approach), and
by the squabbles over how to deal with the financial crisis of the euro. In
such an environment, EU joint action is restricted to the lowest standards
acceptable to all states, or to the very limited redistributive functions in the
fields of regional development policy and the varying budgetary contributions
of its member states.
Given these circumstances, as Fritz Scharpf has asserted,
European integration has created a constitutional asymmetry between policies
promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and
equality. National welfare states are legally and economically constrained by
European rules of economic integration, liberalization, and competition law,
whereas efforts to adopt European social policies are politically impeded by
the diversity of national welfare states, differing not only in levels of economic
development and hence in their ability to pay for social transfers and services
but, even more significantly, in their normative aspirations and institutional
structures.11
The failure to reconcile market liberalisation with social standards also serves
to exacerbate the unease voiced by some over immigration in EU states. In any
quasi-federal system, free movement of labour should be accompanied by
financial provision to ameliorate social costs that arise (eg for housing, edu-
cation, healthcare, etc.). This could be funded by a levy on the economic inter-
ests that benefit from immigration, for example, large food processors and
supermarkets. No such systems exist within the EU.
In any case, it is difficult to see how the EU can promote itself as the sort of
social market community urged, for example, by Habermas,12 when so many
of its members would veto such a role for it (no doubt in many cases due to an
absence of solidarity), and when the austerity measures taken in the wake of
the Eurozone crisis undermine social justice. The real worry is that, while the
EU lacks its own redistributive social justice policy, for the reasons already
outlined, it nonetheless interferes with member states’ social policies, depriv-
ing them of an ability to regulate. This results in asymmetrical and unbalanced
integration.
Abnegation of justice in the crisis of the Eurozone
A further example of injustice in the EU is provided by the handling of the
Eurozone crisis. Since its onset, EU states and institutions have stumbled
from summit to summit, instigating a seemingly incessant series of measures
11 Fritz Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’ (2008) Max Planck
Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Working Paper 02/08. See also Christian Joerges, ‘The Rechtsstaat and
Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European Integration Process’ (2010) 9 Com-
parative Sociology 65–85.
12 See, eg, Jürgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’ (2001) 11 New Left Review 5–27.
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in an ad hoc and reactive way.13 Once we examine the details of what the EU
has actually done in its attempts to solve the Eurozone crisis, we can see that
the scope and impact of measures taken have been formidable, as for example
the imposition of ‘conditionality’ clauses in bailout agreements. The con-
ditions imposed by the Greek bailout in 2010 (described by one author as
‘the most drastic intervention in a member state’s economic and social
policy ever decided by the EU’14) required Greece to end its deficit situation
by adopting measures including the reduction of pensions, the reduction of
public investment and a reform of wage legislation in the public sector.
Beyond specific bailout packages, more general legislative measures were
introduced, such as the 2011 measures colloquially known as the ‘Six-
Pack’,15 or the 2012 ‘Fiscal Compact Treaty’,16 under which EU institutions
may scrutinise national budgets prior even to scrutiny by their state’s parlia-
ment (a huge challenge to democracy in itself), and, if a state fails to reduce its
debts, they can be subject to very large fines. All of these measures were
adopted with little debate and a minimum of public awareness. Most Eur-
opeans have little idea that such changes, involving such inroads into their
government’s economic sovereignty, have taken place.
Further, it would seem that many of these measures have brought the EU
into conflict with both human rights and its own treaties and proclaimed
values. For example, the measures which impose unilateral cuts on wages,
pensions and public spending, and restrict collective bargaining certainly do
not enhance the objective of social justice set out in Article 3 of the TEU.
Further, conditionality clauses in the bailout agreements, which impose
restrictions on the availability of collective bargaining, show little concern
for the freedom of association recognised in the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) and the EU Charter.17
A final criticism is that Article 7 of the Fiscal Compact Treaty, which deals
with the excessive deficit procedure, requires the member states in the Euro-
pean Council to support the European Commission in its decision to take dis-
ciplinary proceedings against another member state, and to base their voting
decisions exclusively on matters of fiscal probity, that is, to have no regard to
other matters such as key constitutional principles and human rights. Such a
13 For more on these matters, see the special issue in the European Law Journal: Hermann Heller, ‘Author-
itarian Liberalism?’ (2015) 21(3) European Law Journal 295.
14 Roland Bieber, ‘Observer—Policeman—Pilot: On Lacunae of Legitimacy and the Contradictions of
Financial Crisis Management in the EU’ (2011) European University Institute Law Working Paper
2011/16.
15 The EU ‘Six-Pack’ sets out provisions for fiscal surveillance, strengthening the earlier Stability and
Growth Pact (under which general government deficits must not exceed 3% of GDP and public debt
must not exceed 60% of GDP).
16 This treaty is an intergovernmental treaty, signed by all members of the EU, except the Czech Republic
and the UK.
17 Further, all EU member states have ratified ILO Convention no 154 on collective bargaining and ILO
Convention no 87 on freedom of association.
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requirement does not comply with other provisions in the EU treaties, par-
ticularly those that set out the importance of a plurality of values for the
EU, such as human rights, solidarity and equality referred to in Article 2 of
the TEU. As Articles 2 and 3 of the TEU make clear, the EU is not a one-
dimensional organisation established for, or limited to, the aim of implement-
ing austerity.
To be more specific about the injustices of the Eurozone crisis, some of
the measures taken in response appear to be in direct contradiction to the
EU’s avowal of social justice in Article 3 of the TEU, as well as an infringe-
ment of certain human rights, for example those of collective bargaining
and freedom of association in the EU Charter. Further, notably, the
crisis of the Euro is also a crisis of supranationalism, of a failure to perceive
the dangers of integration at one level (monetary union) without integrat-
ing in other areas (namely economic or fiscal union), as well as being a
crisis of governance. The solution to this crisis is not obvious. Few
member states desire the deeper union and central control of a fiscal
union. So action continues to be ad hoc and fragmented, and it seems
that much of the resultant injustice is attributable to the very fact of unsa-
tisfactory, unbalanced integration.18
The impossibility of an overarching concept of justice for the EU
Yet one must also engage with the nature of the EU itself. Is it even possible to
find a workable, overarching concept of justice for the EU? It will be noted
that I have not yet suggested any specific meaning or interpretation for the
concept of justice. Indeed, justice may seem so elusive as to be a utopian
ideal. There is no one determinate way of interpreting it. It may be understood
in a rich, substantive sense, or as a complex of fair procedures. It may be
deemed to be closely tied to particular circumstances, or proclaimed as a uni-
versal good for all times. Justice is clearly related to law, but nonetheless
justice also operates as an external standard by which we evaluate law.
Derrida captures these perplexities by interpreting justice as a complex of
aporia, one that demands immediate action, yet infinite time, knowledge
and wisdom in order to do ‘justice’.19 Indeed, Douzinas and Geary find
justice to be somewhat of a philosophical failure, given that no society or
ideology has yet developed a determinate and accepted theory of justice,
and it is therefore probably fair to assume that no such theory can be
developed.20
18 ie Economic and Monetary Union assumes a level playing field. But states are not equal in this union.
Conditions that work for Germany do not work for Greece or Ireland.
19 Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority’ in Drucilla Cornell,Michel Rosen-
feld and David Gray Carlson (eds), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (Routledge, 1992).
20 Costas Douzinas and Adam Geary, Critical Jurisprudence (ch 4, Hart Publishing 2005).
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It is clear that attaining justice in the supranational and pluralist
EU raises very complicated issues. It raises justice in all of its manifold
forms—substantive and procedural, distributive and corrective. For
example, the question of securing social justice in the EU raises very thorny
issues of distributive justice, whereas the problems of the AFSJ will often
turn on issues of corrective justice, which raise different concerns, but may
be equally problematic for a transnational community. Different parties
within the EU—states, EU institutions and private parties—may clearly also
have different obligations of justice.
The very nature of the EU itself causes problems. Namely, it is unfinished,
inchoate and there exists no consensus as to its nature. Should we conceive of
it as an international organisation, as evolving into some sort of ‘superstate’,
or as a sui generis organisation? Clearly, the ways in which we conceive of the
EU will colour our impressions of its capacity for justice. If we believe it is
becoming something more state-like in nature, then we may require it to gen-
erate effective bonds and the type of solidarity necessary for a more substantial
concept of justice.
Further, some of the examples of injustice in the EU have been generated
by the EU’s very nature as a supranational project. Unless the EU becomes a
superstate, a role almost no one would wish for it, it will always have compe-
tences in some areas and very limited powers in others. Its institutions will
lack the full institutional capacities of national governments and parliaments.
They will not be democratic or accountable in the way that state institutions
or parliaments may be, and indeed may not seem democratic at all. Yet those
areas in which the EU’s powers are strong will inevitably cause spillover pro-
blems that are beyond the capacity of functionalist theories to solve. But the
urgency of moments of crisis—9/11 and the Eurozone crisis—will require
swift solutions, which, however, the EU will be perceived as lacking the full
legitimacy to dispense with.
Consequently, there is a sense in which injustice (and not just the inefficiency
bemoaned by some EU commentators) is built into the very nature of the EU
itself. Yet an end to, or reversal of, integration provides no obvious solution. A
vicious circle exists. The imperatives of globalisation—global financial markets
and security threats—render cooperation necessary, and with it the injustices
rendered by the failures and imbalances of integration.21
Therefore, the problem of justice for the EU is considerable and may be
summarised in the following ways:
(i) Justice is undervalued, in that it is not specifically named as a value for
the EU in Article 2 of the TEU (although it is more indirectly
21 For a very different, Rawlsian approach, see Ben Crum, ‘Public Reason and Multi-layered Justice’ (2017)
Transnational Legal Theory doi:10.1080/20414005.2017.1299537 in this issue.
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referenced). It is also undervalued in that its interpretation in the context
of the AFSJ has been reduced to that of the ‘administration of justice’ and
therefore instrumentalised.
(ii) There are specific problems in generating a sense of justice for the EU—
namely, how to agree to such a concept in a transnational context where
there is no shared culture or sense of solidarity, or indeed how to find
agreement as to what the EU itself is or should become. Achieving
social justice is particularly problematic. Transnational law, pluralism
and integration wreak particular injustices, yet a reverse of integration
does not seem feasible.
(iii) The concept of justice is itself contested and subject to a plurality of
interpretations.
Taken together, these points might seem almost to amount to a counsel of
despair, causing a resigned pessimism on the issue of justice in the EU. Should
we therefore agree with Ulrich Haltern, who suggests that those who aim to
create a normative foundation for the EU ‘will be prone to making a laughing
stock of themselves rather than suiting the Union’s purpose’, who proposes
instead that the EU be celebrated for what it is—‘a shallow’ and ‘superficial’
entity engineered for the ‘privileging of the commercial above all else’?22
Well, not quite.
This paper continues with three suggestions for taking the debate further.
First, it argues for a non-ideal understanding of justice, based on the intuition
that our sense of injustice precedes any notion of justice. A sense of injustice
provides a strong motivation that is lost if justice is translated into an abstract
ideal, unrealisable in practice. Any attempt to articulate a notion of justice for
the EU should work with the following intuition: our concept of justice should
be motivating and practicable. Second, it argues that a consensus may be
reached on a limited, but nonetheless important notion of justice
within (EU) law, which I name ‘critical legal justice’. Finally, it suggests
human rights as the most motivating and progressive ethical component
for the EU.
II. The primacy of injustice?
The world that we inhabit, let alone the EU, is immeasurably unjust. Douzinas
and Gearey refer to the ‘great paradox’ in which, ‘[w]e know injustice when we
come across it… but when we discuss qualities of justice both certainty and
emotion recede… Justice and its opposite are not symmetrical’.23 As they
22 Ulrich Haltern, ‘Pathos and Patina: The Failure and Promise of Constitutionalism in the European Imagin-
ation’ (2003) 9(1) European Law Journal 14.
23 Douzinas and Geary (n 20) 28.
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also note, justice is far more likely to move people in its breach than as an aca-
demic exercise or ‘piece of rhetoric that fails to convince or enthuse’.24
Perhaps, then, we should look more closely at the notion of injustice.
An awareness of injustice avoids an over-focus on ideals and takes account
of the contextual inspiration for our sense of justice, the fact that we derive it
from our experiences and responses to varieties of situations. A sense of injury
comes first, which is then followed by a demand for justice. In the past decade,
there has been a turn toward non-ideal theorising about justice. A notable
exponent of this is the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, who has been critical
of such accounts as those of Rawls for being overly focused on an ideal, ‘trans-
cendental’ theory of justice and, as a consequence, unable to offer practical
guidance for remedying injustice in the actual world.25 Sen argues that ‘[a]
theory of justice that can serve as the basis of practical reason must include
ways of judging how to reduce injustice and advance justice, rather than
aiming only at the characterisation of perfectly just societies… ’26
Given the inescapable diversity of human practices and capabilities, and
the pluralism of values, there exists no common standard, no single unit of
measurement for justice. What is needed is a theory of justice for an imperfect
world, which will enable us to move from a situation of ‘more unjust’ to ‘less
unjust’. Sen’s ‘realisation-focused comparison’ focuses on a shared sense of
injustice which people possess, enabling them to agree that a given situation
is unjust, even if they cannot agree on one single reason why they believe it to
be so. For example, individuals may not agree on the reasons why they believe
the war in Iraq is unjust but may nonetheless agree that it is unjust. Our start-
ing point should be the reflection that what justice is seen to require in a par-
ticular situation is initially motivated by feelings of injustice.27
However, this emotive reaction must, for Sen, be coupled with the exercise
of reason. Although our emotions should not be ignored, it is necessary to
assess them critically in order to avoid a visceral, biased and subjective
notion of justice. Furthermore, our decisions must be able to withstand
public scrutiny, and so public reason is necessary to combat injustice.
Nonetheless, while fairness might seem to demand impartiality, this need
not lead to a singular, unique conception of a just society, for there exist
diverse ways in which people may be impartial. Rawls’ mode of impartiality
described in his Theory of Justice assumes a closed, self-contained society.28
Instead of Rawls’ ‘original position’, Sen prefers the approach adopted by
24 Ibid.
25 See, in contrast, Crum’s Rawlsian approach in this issue.
26 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Allen Lane, 2009) ix.
27 See also Hauke Brunkhorst, Critical Theories of Legal Revolutions (Bloomsbury, 2014), who at 7 writes,
‘The central driving force of the social is a struggle between material and ideal interest over normative
claims and violations that are articulated by the societal sense of injustice’.
28 This assumption is highly problematic for the EU, as the positing of a single, self-contained society
seems to remove the possibility of transnational justice.
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Adam Smith, whose Theory of Moral Sentiments employs an ‘impartial spec-
tator’. For Smith, the impartial spectator is a creature produced by the moral
power of the imagination, who shapes the moral sensibility of an ethically sen-
sitive person. Smith’s spectator does not represent an ideal, for he requires one
to look at issues ‘with the eyes of other people’, and from the viewpoint of ‘real
spectators’. Thus the plurality of impartial reasoning is ensured, and is more
appropriate in the transnational, multi-cultural EU, where no one monolithic
perspective exists.
The key point here is that we place unrealistic demands on citizens if we
start with justice as an ideal, pre-existing, neutral concept that is self-produced
by a rational mind, as it is understood in the work of Kant, who requires us to
act, ‘not from inclination, but duty… the necessity to act out of reverence for
the law’.29 But this is uninspiring for most people—it represents a distant icon,
or even a delusion. It is injustice, and its emotional sources, which inspire
most people. Social psychology therefore is as much a crucial component of
our moral reasoning as philosophy.
In summary, we should not ignore the importance of our sense of injustice
as a motivator, a call to resistance, instilling us with a sense of responsibility to
take action, in Sen’s words, ‘a matter of actualities, of preventing manifest
injustice in the world, of changes, large or small, to people’s lives—the abol-
ition of slavery, improvement of conditions in the workplace—realisation of
an improvement in the lives of actual peoples’.30 This is an important realis-
ation. It underlines the fact that, even in the absence of any coherent, substan-
tive concept of justice for the EU overall, a sense of injustice may animate EU
citizens, making some recognition of some correlative principles of justice
necessary. In the final sections, I consider how this intuition can be put to
work, namely, how is it possible to realise a non-ideal, practical, yet motiva-
tional understanding of justice for the EU.
III. The rule of law and critical legal justice
Law is not merely a theoretical pursuit or an academic discipline. Law is also
practical—lawyers, judges and others daily face the necessity of actually doing
justice in their application and enforcement of the law. They cannot put into
practice unworkably idealistic theories, but nor can they give up and renounce
law’s aspirations to justice. How then, given the perplexities of justice in the
EU outlined in the last sections, may EU law make good on its task to do
justice?
The rule of law is what is very often understood by the concept of ‘legal
justice’, importantly acknowledging the rule of law as form of justice. There
29 Immanuel Kant, ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals’, in Practical Philosophy, A. Wood (ed) (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996) 4.
30 Sen (n 26) see ch 1.
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exists a strong intuition that power, position and status should not corrupt
justice, and the rule of law functions to constrain the abuse of power. The
rule of law has traditionally been seen to require laws to rest on legal
norms that are general in character, relatively clear, certain, public, prospec-
tive and stable, as well as to recognise the equality of subjects before the law.31
Some would add to this the protection of fundamental rights,32 although, if it
includes too many rights, the simplicity of the rule of law is lost, and it begins
to look more like a complete social philosophy.33 The rule of law’s benefits can
be stated simply. Its observance enhances certainty, predictability and secur-
ity, both among individuals and between citizens and government, as well as
restricting governmental discretion. It restricts the abuse of power. Unlike
many substantive theories of justice, the rule of law—at least in its more
limited procedural sense—does not require adhesion to a particular moral
philosophy. Indeed, for that very reason it may be thought to be a somewhat
thin notion of justice. However, it has the very palpable advantage that, due to
its lack of reliance on any comprehensive moral theory, it may be embraced by
those with widely disparate moral beliefs, and by differing cultures and
societies. This feature is also fundamental for any notion that is to find pur-
chase in the EU.
Elsewhere I have argued that the rule of law be recast as ‘critical legal
justice’, in order to distinguish it from discredited understandings of the
rule of law.34 I also wish to identify it more clearly with justice rather than
with, for example, the bland identification of the rule of law as a value in
Article 2 of the TEU, whose content is empty and undefined.35 The application
of critical legal justice involves, at its best, a remorseless and pervasive holding
to account, and attention to the detail of law-making and transparency.
I do not argue that the rule of law exhausts justice, but rather that it is an
essential element of it. It is also particularly needed in the EU. The lack of the
rule of law has been glaring and damaging in areas of EU affairs, such as in the
lack of access to courts in the criminal law pillar of the EU (at least until the
Lisbon Treaty), or the lack of institutional balance which has granted too
much power to unelected, unaccountable agencies such as Eurojust,
Europol or member state executives in the Council, or in less than transpar-
ent, almost secretive, law-making.36 This lack of the rule of law is also evident
31 See, eg, Joseph Raz ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195, 196.
32 See, eg, Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane, 2010).
33 Raz (n 31).
34 Namely, those understandings of the Rule of Law that have been perceived as overly formalist and blind
to difference.
35 Notably, the rule of law is nowhere defined in the EU treaties and different member states have differ-
ent understandings of it. For example, it is understood as Etat de Droit in France, Rechtstaat in Germany
and so on. See also Laurent Pech, ‘A Union Founded on the Rule of Law’ (2010) 6 European Consti-
tutional Law Review 359.
36 See, eg, Case C-345/06, Gottfried Heinrich [2009] ECR 000. The Treaty of Prüm, dealing with justice and
security matters, also provided a fine example of untransparent law-making.
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in the Eurozone, of whose measures Steve Peers has commented ‘fail the test
of transparency, because of their near-total complexity and unreadability,
scattered across a dozen primary, secondary and soft-law sources, with
more to come’.37 Further, the experience of actions taken in the course of
the ‘war on terror’, such as the willingness of some EU states to accept
landing US flights in the course of ‘extraordinary rendition’,38 and the unwill-
ingness of the EU to take any action against those states under Article 7 of the
TEU, also suggests that the rule of law, along with human rights, has been lost
in a search for ‘expedient’ measures.
Therefore, I identify the rule of law, recast as critical legal justice, as a form
of ‘legal justice’. However, I do not argue for it as an example of a transcen-
dental, idealist theory, but rather, to use a prosaic term, as an element in the
legal toolbox. Critical legal justice and (I shall go on to argue) human rights
provide a background theory of justice (itself the product of a practical con-
sensus around a variety of different accounts) within which EU law can
operate. Understood in a non-perfectionist, non-ideal sense, they offer a
meaningful mechanism by which legal institutions may avoid causing injus-
tice and thereby a contribution to a better world. There exists a sufficient con-
sensus for us to embrace their use.
IV. And finally… human rights
It is hard to be a critical lawyer or philosopher and yet provide some positive
element, some platform for hope or concrete legal development; much easier
to criticise and deride. Nonetheless, the imperative of the first section of this
paper remains. How to instil a normative element into EU law, an element
providing hope, and a belief that it stands for more than a market mentality
and soulless bureaucrats. Yet such efforts seem almost doomed to fail, given
the huge challenge set by the nature of the EU itself: the supranational project,
the impossibility of attaining agreement from 28 different systems and cul-
tures, most of them also internally pluralistic, not to forget the state as
jealous guardian of values. Vital as it may be, critical legal justice is too minim-
alist to provide such inspiration.
If it is hard to articulate a substantive concept of justice for the EU, might
not human rights instead serve as its normative foundation? Or do they also
prove problematic, especially given the disdain that some states such as the
UK seem to reserve for human rights, and more particularly supranational
human rights systems? I believe it is possible for human rights to function
37 See Steve Peers, ‘Analysis: Draft Agreement on Reinforced Economic Union’ (December 2011) State-
watch 21 .
38 For which, see Al Nashiri v Poland [2015] 60 EHRR 16. In that case the ECHR found that Poland hosted a
secret CIA prison at a military intelligence training base in Stare Kiejkuty where the applicant was held
incommunicado and tortured.
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as a basic value system and vehicle of normative legitimacy for the EU, and I
briefly set out why below.
Human rights as the solution to the violation of justice
In The Ethos of Europe: Values, Law and Justice in the EU, Andrew Williams
castigated the EU for lacking any coherence in its values, or ethos, and for the
absence of a clear moral purpose, suggesting that the EU’s ethos has been
technical rather than ethical, with the requirements of the market providing
a ‘value surrogacy’.39 The EU has not taken justice seriously. Williams’
suggested solution to this failure is a human rights-centred concept of
justice, because human rights ‘provide cultural, philosophical and legal
strength and application across the Member States’, and are ‘equipped to
provide a framework for practical initiatives aimed to achieve substantive
notions of justice’.40 I agree with much of Williams’ argument. Human
rights are crucial and should play a vital role in European integration.
However, human rights are not identical to justice,41 although they may be
an essential part of an understanding of justice. For many years, concepts of
justice flourished without any reference to human rights, which only really
came into their own as a doctrine in the eighteenth century.42 Yet for
many, human rights now occupy the full terrain of moral discourse. While
recognising that human rights and justice are not complete co-equivalents,
for the remainder of this paper, I seek to focus on why human rights
provide a more fruitful focus for our moral concerns in the EU, given the per-
plexities of justice already outlined.
Human rights as the first moral element in (EU) law
For many people, it is both essential and inevitable to turn first to human
rights in the search for a moral element in law. It has become commonplace
to describe them as a ‘secular religion’ for our times,43 or, as depicted by Sousa
Santos, a ‘political esperanto’,44 a creed which has displaced other once-
favoured concepts such as distributive justice or equality. Generally, they
39 Williams (n 9) 223.
40 Andrew Williams, ‘Promoting Justice after Lisbon: Groundwork for a New Philosophy of EU Law’ (2010)
30 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 663.
41 For some time I struggled with this, believing that it should be possible to articulate a doctrine of justice
for the EU that was not very heavily dependent on human rights. As will be clear, I have now given up
this struggle, and believe that any workable doctrine of justice in the EU must be human rights-centred.
42 See eg, Lynne Hunt, Inventing Human Rights (Norton, 2007).
43 Elie Wiesel, ‘A Tribute to Human Rights’, in Yael Danieli et al. (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: Fifty Years and Beyond (Baywood, 1999).
44 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic
Transition (Butterworths, 1995) 348.
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are seen as praiseworthy—it is hard to deride the ‘idea’ of human rights (as
opposed to less than optimal applications of them).
Human rights also possess a crucial advantage over justice in the EU
dimension. There has been political agreement over their content and articu-
lation, and this agreement takes concrete form in the EU Charter (and also in
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) which, since the Treaty
of Lisbon, has been legally binding and has the same legal status as EU treaties.
The EU Courts have been working with fundamental rights for many years,
and although we may be critical of some of the attendant case law, at least
there exists a receptiveness to fundamental rights as both a philosophical
and legal concept (even if this receptiveness might seem at present to be
undermined by the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) focus on autonomy
in its Opinion 2/13 finding45). Although there has been criticism of the EU
Charter and the ECHR (particularly from the UK), and though these docu-
ments may present their own problems, they nonetheless provide a material
and powerful focus for the application of human rights. On the other hand,
as we have seen, there exists no such consensus or focus on the notion of
justice in the EU, which is omitted as an EU value and elsewhere (such as
within the AFSJ) is degraded to a minor notion. Therefore, the basic point
is this: there exists political consensus on human rights protection in the
EU, translated into material form in the canonical text of the EU Charter.
This presents an actuality and stability notably absent from other, more
inchoate notions of justice in the EU.
Inadequacies?
However, this may seem overconfident. Politically, human rights may be at
the fore, a marching banner of any politician, cause or global movement
that wishes to claim a moral highground, but conceptually, there exists a
great deal of scepticism as to what human rights actually are, a scepticism
that is partly the product of so many (different and competing) causes and
movements claiming human rights for themselves. Bentham’s critique that
human rights are ‘nonsense on stilts’ highlights their wobbly conceptual foun-
dation, still shaky 200 years later. Does this take us back to our quandary and
dissatisfaction with justice? Can human rights be truly valuable, then, as
weapons to counter injustice?
Moreover, converting human rights into law involves what Conor Gearty
describes as a ‘Faustian bargain’.46 Law is not notable for its radical,
45 Opinion 2/13 Accession to the ECHR [2014] ECR 000. Here it was held that the EU draft agreement for
accession to the ECHR was not compatible with EU law. See further, Sionaidh Douglas-Scott,
‘Opinion 2/13 and the “elephant in the room”: A response to Daniel Halberstam’ (2015) VerfBlog,
online: <http://verfassungsblog.de/opinion-213-and-the-elephant-in-the-room-a-response-to-daniel-
halberstam-2/>. accessed 2 March 2017.
46 Conor Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (Hamlyn Lectures) (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 67.
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progressive nature, and the translation of rights into law risks jettisoning any
emancipatory force rights may have, even setting them in opposition to poli-
tics. A legal claim for rights takes on an antagonistic form, constructed around
a paradigm of two parties, diminishing any public interest. Marx’s critique
highlights how rights have been misused, appropriated and have become
tools of ideology, a possession of the dominant class.47 There is a risk of
the corruption of human rights by law, and if the moral imperatives of
human rights are contorted and made misshapen, then human rights
become not a means of ensuring law’s justice, but the reverse.
Further, EU law presents its own problems in the human rights field. The
history of human rights protection in the EU has not been a complete success
story, and there still remains much to do.48 First, the scope of EU law has
become the main determining factor for the existence of a human rights vio-
lation, as the EU Charter cannot be applied if the action does not first fall
within the scope of EU law. Yet, this jurisdictional limitation is complex in
the extreme,49 transforming legal argument and the legal literature into a
debate about the arcane limits of the EU’s competences rather than a focus
on human rights. Moreover, the history of human rights protection in the
EU, particularly through the legal decisions of the ECJ, readily translates
into the form of a familiar narrative: that human rights were not concerns
of the EU’s founders, but instead grudgingly recognised by the ECJ in the
face of a threat to the sovereignty of EU law, and European integration
more generally, from national constitutional courts which threatened to dis-
apply EU acts that failed to comply with their human rights standards. As a
result, the fear is that human rights have become instrumentalised to
further European integration.
Why do human rights still preoccupy us?
There is some truth in the suspicions of human rights manipulation outlined
above. However it is not the whole story. Why then, in spite of these reser-
vations, might human rights be the best hope for a normative element in
EU law?
We should be clear that evidence of abuse of human rights for certain ends
does not disqualify them as emancipatory devices. There are two explanations
47 Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’ in Waldron (ed), Nonsense upon Stilts (Methuen, 1987). In the past,
rights in EU law have too often been invoked not by individuals, but by corporate applicants and other
powerful entities. See, eg, Grainne de Burca, ‘The Language of Rights and European Integration’ in
Gillian More and Jo Shaw (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Union, (Oxford University Press, 1996).
48 For more on this see, eg, Jason Coppell and Aidan O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights
Seriously?’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 669, 689; S Douglas-Scott, ‘Human Rights in the Euro-
pean Legal Space?’ in Jo Shaw, Stephen Tierney and Neil Walker (eds), Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic
(Hart Publishing, 2011).
49 Examples may be found in cases such as Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609; Case 60/00 Carpenter
[2002] ECR I-627 and more recently Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-0000.
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for this—one relating to psychological features and the other to the fact that
human rights provide a hugely powerful vision of, and means toward, a demo-
cratic and socially just society. These explanations come together to explain
the continued centrality of human rights as the prime ethical motivation
for contemporary western society. They have a powerful practical force and
relate to our innermost hopes and needs. These two points will be briefly
explored.
First, if the discourse of human rights had never been more than rhetoric, a
handy tool for those in power, it would not have become hegemonic, and it
would not have delivered actual results. Human rights have succeeded as
the contemporary expression of aspirations for justice because they can
produce concrete benefits and improvements for those who assert them.
The power of human rights derives partly from their practical success.
Rights are not merely individual protections against the state but also
advance the case for societal transformation. Not only do human rights
acknowledge the moral worth of the individual but they also recognise the
individual’s place in society as a member of different associations and
groups. They can protect the weak and vulnerable and also those who have
strong opinions to voice. The EU Charter does both by containing, in one
document, both civil and political rights, and economic and social rights,
thus stressing the indivisibility of human rights. Human rights place obli-
gations on those in power that impact how they shape policy and make
decisions (this is evident in the requirement that EU officials take account
of the EU Charter in all their decision-making). They also restrain the
abuse of power by imposing all sorts of side-constraints.
In sum, human rights articulate a vision of, and the practical means to
work toward, a more just society and a flourishing democratic culture. As
Williams argues, ‘[i]t is not self-evident that any other value has the capacity,
normative stability or political support to produce an ethical framework that
does justice to the EU’s sui generis nature and position and will evoke suffi-
cient public allegiance’.50 I believe Williams’ arguments to be persuasive.
Human rights do evoke public allegiance in a way that abstract conceptions
of justice do not, and a human rights-centred pathway toward justice in the
EU carries a distinct advantage over an attempt to articulate and enforce a
stronger more substantive conception of justice.
However, there is also a second explanation for the strong pull of human
rights as the primary ethical basis for any modern polity, and it derives from
our deep psychological needs. It can be explained in the following way. In
contemporary western culture, governance is often experienced as devoid of
any ethically compelling nature, and law is too often felt only as externally
50 Andrew Williams, ‘Promoting Justice after Lisbon: Prospects for a New Philosophy of EU Law’ Warwick
School of Law Research Paper No. 2009/07, 50.
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coercive and not internally binding or compelling. In the terminology of HLA
Hart, few citizens experience an ‘internal point of view’.51 In these circum-
stances, governments exert some control by exercising a politics of fear and
security, and justice is diminished to an emaciated ‘administration of
justice’. This provokes a condition of anomie, a crisis in which society pro-
vides little moral guidance to its citizens, engendering a sense of futility,
emotional despair and emptiness,52 what Nietzsche described as ‘the dead
stop, a retrospective weariness, the will turning against life’.53 One response
to this crisis is nihilism, which takes a variety of forms—whether of destruc-
tive acts of terrorism, or instead, to use again the words of Nietzsche, ‘a Euro-
pean Buddhism’, namely a resigned recognition that life has no meaning or
goal,54 that in the absence of any universal moral standards, we can set our
own, should we so wish. For the philosopher Simon Critchley, what is
needed to combat this nihilist drift is a philosophical activism—an empower-
ing concept of ethics.55
In these circumstances, critical legal justice—however essential to prevent
injustice—is unlikely to provide the motivation to overcome this sense of
anomie, which is especially palpable in the EU context. The same may be
said for notions of procedural justice or accountability more generally. For
such concepts are responsive; they place checks and constraints on insti-
tutions and thereby reduce scope for injustice, but fail to establish any
more active duties. They fail to inspire visions of a better society.
This is where human rights come into the picture. Faced with despair and
the prospect of nihilism, we search for something to give meaning to our lives.
In human rights, we locate the nearest thing to religion, or magic, for the
attainment of our fantasy. Human rights play the role of Lacan’s petit objet
a, or objects of our desire.56 Conor Gearty writes of human rights being
able to ‘work its magic’. This use of the word ‘magic’ is revealing—for the
embrace of human rights can even take us beyond rational attachment, to
the attribution of an almost supernatural force, identified in terms of religion,
magic or ‘alchemy’.57 It is very important to understand this facet of human
rights—an almost irrational belief in their power. Indeed, the enduring nature
of human rights is inexplicable if we ignore this dimension. So this second
51 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1961) 89.
52 Emile Durkheim, Suicide (Free Press, 1951).
53 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) (Walter Arnold Kaufmann, tr, Vintage Books,
1969) 5.
54 Ibid.
55 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding (Verso, 2007).
56 For an expression of these views, see Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Thought at the
Turn of the Century (Hart, 2000); Renata Salecl, ‘Rights in Feminist and Psychoanalytic Perspective’ (1995)
Cardozo Law Review 1121.
57 See, eg, Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Harvard University Press, 1991); Albie Sachs,
The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law (Oxford University Press, 2010). The latter being a work by South
African constitutional court judge discussing human rights cases.
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function of human rights is a psychological, almost spiritual one: to fulfil an
essential gap, a desire for ethical resolution and moral meaning.
It might be asked: is this not also the case with justice itself? Is not justice
also a placeholder for meaning in our lives, an object of desire? This may be
so. But, within the EU, justice has not to-date developed the kind of normative
stability nor popular public allegiance to which Williams refers to as applying
in the case of human rights. Therefore, I believe these two different expla-
nations come together to elucidate the continued centrality of human rights
as the most salient moral force in the EU.
V. Conclusion
Therefore, human rights bring with them much promise and ambition—
self-evidence, universality, inalienability, ‘values for a godless age’.58 Even
if on closer inspection many of these promises seem incapable of being
fulfilled—if no adequate foundation can be found for them, if they are
just as often used cynically as earnestly—they are still available as a
resource, more powerful perhaps than any other moral resource for law
today. Even those most sceptical of what law has become see human
rights as a means of returning ethics to law, acknowledging their
utopian, emancipatory possibilities.59 Whatever the source of conflict,
there is still the essence of a common language here, a currency that all
can understand, even if it is interpreted differently. There is, further, a
means of importing morality and ethics into law, the basis for substantive
justice, and a reminder that we should not tolerate the intolerable or suffer
the insufferable.
I have tried to highlight the injustices of aspects of EU law, and suggested
that there exists no overarching theory of justice, per se, that is workable for
the EU. The rule of law, reimagined as critical legal justice, is a vital tool for
deterring injustice, but inadequate of itself as a motivating force and articula-
tion of principles for a more just society. It is in human rights, even if some-
times unsatisfactory in their concrete realisation in the EU, that we find
essential moral ingredients for EU law, not only as ingredients of critical
legal justice, but also going beyond it, as positive ideals or aspirations for
the law.
Marie Benedicte Dembour wrote a highly regarded book with the titleWho
Believes in Human Rights?60 She acknowledged that her book grew out of both
an attraction to, and a discomfort with, human rights; a certain ambivalence.
58 Francesca Klug, Values for a Godless Age: The Story of the United Kingdom’s New Bill of Rights, (Penguin,
2000).
59 See, eg, Douzinas (n 56).
60 Marie-Benedicte Dembour,Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention (Cam-
bridge, 2006).
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Now is the time for the EU to move beyond ambivalence and to state clearly
that it believes in human rights as the best route to justice.61
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